Free Agency is a Minefield of Risk for MLB Teams

MLB is trending younger, which is why so many veteran free agents remain unsigned

The average Major League Baseball salary increased for the 13th consecutive year in 2017, reaching $4.47 million, though the rate of growth is slowing, according to USA TODAY Sports’ annual salary survey. Meanwhile, industry revenues topped $10 billion.

While player salaries are increasing, the average age of MLB players is falling.

At 30.4 years, the Atlanta Braves had the highest average player age in 2017. In a change from previous decades, MLB rosters are now driven by a youth movement and tend to be filled with players in their mid to late-20s.

The average age of the oldest Major League Baseball player for every team is now 37 years. The numbers show that the game is skewing younger. In fact, this is a Golden Age for players 25 and younger.

The All Star team is now populated by young stars in their 20s, rather than players in their 30s. Players age 25 and under made up more than a quarter of the two All Star teams in 2015. The game’s biggest, brightest stars are relative youngsters.

Among position players in their age-25 seasons or younger, nine of the top 11, in terms of Baseball-Reference’s version of WAR, were on the two All Star teams in 2017. On the pitching side, six of the top seven were under age 25.

Another indication that All Stars are trending younger is this: of the 68 players named to the 2017 All-Star Game, 28 were first-timers.

In 2016, Kris Bryant was the National League MVP at age 24, while Mike Trout won his second American League MVP at 25. Last season, Jose Altuve and Giancarlo Stanton each won their league’s respective MVP Award at age 27.

The age of the best hitters in baseball fell to 26.8 in 2012 from 30.1 in 2002, a decline of over three years in just a decade.

The use of steroids, human growth hormone (HGH) and other PEDs once allowed players to extend their prime years into their mid and late-30s. However, stringent testing no longer allows older players to artificially extend their careers. Their declines now come earlier and are more pronounced.

During the Steroid Era, a 34-year old player might have been viewed as still in his prime; not any more. Now he’s considered over the hill or, at the least, in decline.

There are still some good 35-year-old players; there are just fewer of them these days. There are even less great 35-year-old olds at present and there are hardly any great players from the ages of 36-40.

Teams see older players as riskier; in other words, likelier to be injured and to decline precipitously.

This is why so many older free agents remain unsigned. It’s the reason why teams are reluctant to grant expensive, long term contracts to players in their 30s. Most clubs would prefer to overpay a player for three or four years than to be constrained by a six, seven or even eight-year deal.

This is why the Red Sox, for example, are hesitant to give JD Martinez the seven-year contract he desires at age 30. Such a pact would take him through his age-36 season, when he will surely be in decline.

Front offices across baseball are now populated by highly-educated, young executives who are obsessed by statistics, especially sabermetrics. There is no chart, graph or diagram that agent Scott Boras can present them about a player that they don’t already know. These execs are fully aware that players peak in their late 20s, as they have for many decades.

For organizations, a player’s 30s are a decade of risk, at best, and of uncertainty, at least. In fact, the only certainty is that players in their 30s are in a steady decline. That’s why baseball executives are very cautious about giving them the guaranteed, long term contracts that often make them the highest paid players in the game.

Smart franchises — which means all of them these days — draft and develop their own players, creating a core, and then hang onto them until they reach free agency, which is often around age 30. As I noted previously, it’s a bad system for the players too. A merit-based system would not only be more equitable; it would make more sense.

In time, the player’s union will push the owners to be both more equitable and more sensible. It will be good for baseball.

Red Sox Should Continue to Exercise Patience in Quest for JD Martinez

Red Sox fans are freaking out right now. We’re approaching Christmas and the club still hasn't signed the middle-of-the-order power hitter that they’ve been missing since David Ortiz retired following the 2016 season.

Fans are often reactionary and impatient. They are passionate and want what they want right now. They don’t want to be composed, even-tempered and accommodating. It’s not their money that will be spent this offseason; it’s John Henry’s money and he’s a billionaire.

However, team president Dave Dombrowski has to consider the long-term interests of the Red Sox, not just the most immediate. As I’ve noted previously, most players enter free agency at around age 30, like JD Martinez, for example. The problem is that players begin to decline in their 30s and their aging bodies are at greater risk for injury.

The holdup with Martinez, who is by far the best free agent slugger available this winter, is that his agent, Scott Boras, is touting him as a $200 million player. Such a suggestion is absurd and entirely without merit. To reach $200 million, Martinez would have to receive a seven-year contract, with an average annual cost of $29 million.

Simply put, Martinez is not worth that much annually and, most importantly, he is not worthy of a seven-year investment. Few players are. Such a contract would take him through his age-36 season.

Like most players, Martinez will have begun an inevitable decline by age 35 and the Red Sox would still be paying him like he was a 29-year-old superstar.

Five years, $125 million seems reasonable for Martinez. That would give him an average annual cost of $25 million.

The 30-year-old slugger is a defensive liability in the outfield. The major defensive metrics — Defensive Runs Saved and Ultimate Zone Rating -- grade him unfavorably. When in right field (where he has played 439 of his 674 games in the field), Martinez has trouble getting to relatively catchable balls. Simply put, he has poor range and costs his team runs. That matters… a lot. Defense is a critical, though often overlooked, aspect of the game.

Putting Martinez in left field would require trading Jackie Bradley, one of the game's premier defensive outfielders, and shifting Andrew Benintendi to center. The Red Sox defense would undoubtedly suffer in that scenario and it would cost them runs.

However, Martinez sure can slug. In fact, he posted a .690 slugging percentage last season, which was higher than Giancarlo Stanton’s .631 slugging. However, Martinez only had 489 plate appearances, while a player needs 502 to qualify. He also belted 45 homes in just 119 games. Clearly, his power is not in dispute.

Offensive production aside, part of Martinez's free agent appeal is the fact that, since he was traded from Detroit to Arizona at midseason, there is no draft compensation attached to his services.

Yet, nothing in Martinez’s first three seasons with Houston suggested that he would become a premier slugger. Take a look at this rather underwhelming stint with the Astros:

2011: 53 games, 226 plate appearances, 13 2B, 6 HR, 35 RBI, .274 BA/.319 OBP/.423 SLG
2012: 113 games, 439 plate appearances, 14 2B, 11 HR, 55 RBI, .241 BA/.311 OBP/.375 SLG
2013: 86 games, 310 plate appearances, 17 2B, 7 HR, 36 RBI, .250 BA/.272 OBP/.378 SLG

It’s easy to see why Houston gave up on Martinez and tough to see what Dombrowski, as Detroit’s GM, saw in him. After all, 252 games and 975 plate appearances are a pretty good sample size.

It’s hard to understand Martinez’s breakout season in 2014, after Dombrowski took a flier on him. It’s also hard to claim that Dombrowski viewed Martinez as some sort of reclamation project since he had no solid history to reclaim.

Yet, Martinez posted the following that year: 30 2B, 23 HR, 76 RBI, .315/.358/.553

Most remarkably, Martinez has gotten markedly better, offensively, since then. He epitomizes the term “late bloomer.”

Now he wants a $200 million deal. If I was Dombrowski, I wouldn’t be buying at that price. The Red Sox president is too savvy to bid against himself. Who are the other bidders at that price?

At this point, Martinez is much better suited to the American League and everybody in baseball knows it. He’s a defensive liability, meaning his greatest value is as a DH. At present, the Red Sox are just about the only club in the AL with the resources and the need for a DH who makes $25 million a year.

That’s why patience should prove to be a virtue. Dombrowski should play the waiting game with Martinez and Boras, until the asking price comes down to a more reasonable five years, $125 million.

Boston has lots of experience with high-priced, long term contacts that went bad and never should have been signed in the first place: Carl Crawford, Hanley Ramirez, Pablo Sandoval and Rusney Castillo are all position players from recent Red Sox history that should serve as cautionary tales.

Stay the course and be patient, Dave. Let sanity and wisdom prevail. Get your man at your price.

Long-Term Contracts are Bad for Baseball

This offseason, free agents Eric Hosmer and JD Martinez are being promoted as $200 million players. Quite plainly, they are not.

From the advent of professional baseball in 1869, players had few rights and were poorly paid. Players were essentially the property of team owners, unable to ply their trade for whichever team they preferred, including the highest bidder. Baseball contracts contained reserve clauses, which forced players to stay with one team in perpetuity, unless traded.

However, St. Louis Cardinals’ outfielder Curt Flood became the first professional athlete to fight for free agency rights in 1969. When Flood found out that he was being traded from the Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies, he wrote a letter to baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn protesting the trade and asserting that he was entitled to consider contract offers from other teams. Commissioner Kuhn denied the outfielder’s petition, so Flood sued Major League Baseball for antitrust violations.

Flood challenged Major League Baseball’s reserve clause, claiming it violated antitrust laws and his 13th Amendment rights. His case made it all the way to the US Supreme Court, where the justices ruled against him, 5-3. The majority determined that baseball was a sport and not a business, and therefore exempt from anti-trust law (imagine that).

In December, 1975, an arbitrator reversed the Supreme Court’s verdict and declared that Major League Baseball players had the right to become free agents upon playing one year for their team without a contract.

With the ruling, the reserve clause was forever terminated from sports, allowing free agency to begin. Major League Baseball also implemented federal arbitration for salary demands, allowing players to negotiate their salaries when their contracts expire.

These changes shifted control from team owners to the players, giving the athletes freedom to block trades and request higher salaries.

In 1976, Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association signed an agreement which allowed players with at least six years of experience to become free agents.

These were watershed moments. I am all for players being fairly compensated and having the freedom to play for whichever team wants them. After all, they are the ones the fans come to see. In essence, they are the ones putting asses in seats at ballparks all across the country. They create enormous revenues from live attendance, television ratings and from the sales of hats, jerseys and other paraphernalia. Simply put, the players should be well-paid.

I also understand that it must be very difficult for a player to be traded, especially in-season, which also affects a player’s family. Players have homes, put down roots in their adopted cites and often have kids in school. This is why free agent veterans sometimes fight to have no-trade clauses inserted into their contracts.

Having said all of that, we have reached a time when too much power has shifted to players.

Top free agents are now insisting on opt-out clauses, as well as no-trade clauses, in their contracts. Why do owners agree to such excesses? If the player performs well, he can opt-out and walk away, under no obligation to honor the remaining years on his contract. On the other hand, if the player is injured or otherwise underperforms his contract, his team is obligated to pay him in full for the contract’s duration. If the team wants to rebuild, or unload the player’s contract for any reason, that player can also refuse to be traded.

This is insanity and the owners need to make it stop.

Giancarlo Stanton is just the latest example of this extreme power shift to star players.

Stanton had a no-trade clause and an opt-out clause inserted into his mammoth, 13-year, $325 million contract. The contract was so long, and so expensive that it was far too cumbersome for the Marlins, as well as for the vast majority of major league teams.

Point in case: the Marlins recently sold for $1.2 billion to Derek Jeter and a group led by New York businessman Bruce Sherman. So, Stanton’s ridiculous contract represented more than a quarter of the team’s price. The MVP of the league is so grossly overpaid that his contract was a liability to the organization that gave it to him, as it would be to all but a handful of teams in baseball.

Former Marlins owner Jeffrey Loria signed Stanton to that deal knowing it wouldn’t be his burden for long. Loria had every intention of selling the club, which is why he backloaded the pact for the next owners to deal with.

The Yankees were among a handful of clubs that could financially absorb Stanton’s contract and they still got $30 million from the Marlins (which will only kick in if he refuses to opt out after the 2020 season) to help pay Stanton.

Stanton has been on the disabled list in four different seasons and averaged just 117 games over his first seven years in the majors. He may be just 28 now, but players don’t get healthier in their 30s and most don’t get better either.

That speaks to the insanity of long-term contracts. They almost never work out for the team that signs them. Players typically hit free agency at around age 30, the decade in which they become more susceptible to injuries and begin their inevitable decline.

As history shows, massive, long term contracts are only good for the players who sign them. The teams that agree to such deals are usually left holding the bag, and with many regrets.

Alex Rodriguez, Joe Mauer, Prince Fielder, Mark Teixeira, Jayson Werth, Troy Tulowitzki, Carl Crawford, Jose Reyes, Jacoby Ellsbury, Josh Hamilton, Matt Kemp, Ryan Howard, Shin-Soo Choo, Albert Pujols and Jason Heyward, for example, all vastly underperformed their expensive, long term contracts and the teams that signed them would surely love a do-over.

This offseason, teams seem to think that keeping top free agents in limbo for as long as possible will drive down prices. We can only hope they are right. Teams believe that players will eventually worry about getting a job, which will result in a discount from the original asking prices.

Most teams can’t afford to spend huge sums in free agency, only to have the decision blow up in their faces. They cannot afford to have a high-priced player fail spectacularly on their watch. The smart GMs are perceived as the ones who spend wisely and win with low to moderate payrolls.

Organizations see free agency as a big, risky gamble. Huge sums of money will be wasted on players who will eventually get hurt or underperform. Guaranteed contracts are a game of roulette for the owners. Such terms don’t exist for almost any other workers in any industry.

In short, free agency is widely viewed by clubs as inefficient and wasteful. Yes, there are rosters to fill and needs to address, but teams need to spend their money wisely, not foolishly. The reality is that almost all long-term, big-dollar contracts ultimately prove to be a mistake for the teams who sign them.

Players such as JD Martinez and Eric Hosmer — both Scott Boras clients, not incidentally — are being promoted as $200 million players this offseason. Such a claim is without merit; neither player is worth anything near that amount. We can only hope that sanity prevails.

A player will get whatever the market will offer. However, if owners were smart, or had any guts, they would stop paying players in their 30s for past performance.

Any contract of at least six years, and certainly of seven or more, can be deemed long term, and they are a minefield of risks. There are few teams that can afford to fail spectacularly with players such as Carl Crawford or Jacoby Ellsbury, for example.

The entire system is backwards and geared toward failure. Young players are under team control for six years and only become arbitration eligible after three. Breakout rookies and young stars in year-two or three shouldn’t have to wait be among the highest-paid players in the game.

Players such as Aaron Judge and Cody Bellinger should have been among the game’s highest paid players last season. Instead, Judge was paid a mere $544,000, while Bellinger earned just $468,000.

On the other hand, Ellsbury was paid over $21 million for slashing 264/.348/.402, with 7 HR, 39 RBI, 20 doubles and 22 steals. Crawford was so awful that the Dodgers paid him $21 million to simply go away in 2016 and then they paid him another $21 million to not play for them again in 2017. It’s madness.

Aging, underperforming veterans should be paid like first and second-year players, while young stars should be able to cash in right away. Baseball earnings should be a merit-based system, related to current performance, not past performance or the fact that a team controls a young player.

The current system isn’t working, and the repeated failure of large, long-term contracts proves it.

Jack Morris is now a Hall of Famer; is he Really Worthy?

Former Detroit Tigers teammates Jack Morris and Alan Trammell were elected to the baseball Hall of Fame on Sunday. Both players were picked by a 16-man Modern Baseball Era Committee that considered 10 candidates whose biggest contributions came from 1970-87.

Let’s consider Morris’ candidacy.

Morris was on the Hall of Fame ballot for the 15th and final time in 2014 and never received the required 75% of the vote in any of his eligible years. After careful examination and scrutiny, the Baseball Writers’ Association of America deemed him a borderline candidate, unworthy of induction into sports' greatest, most demanding Hall of Fame.

The righty has always been one of the most controversial candidates, not because of PEDs, but simply due to his credentials.

Over 18 seasons, Morris posted the following:

254 wins
3.90 ERA
175 complete games
28 shutouts
2,478 strikeouts
1.30 WHIP

Morris was also a five-time All Star who twice led the American League in wins. He also led the AL in strikeouts once and shutouts once. Additionally, Morris is the only pitcher with 2,000-plus strikeouts who did not face a single pitcher in his career, meaning his Ks weren’t padded, like some NL pitchers.

The number that really jumps out in Morris' long career is his 175 complete games. For comparison, CC Sabathia leads all active pitchers with 38 complete games over 17 seasons. It’s unlikely that we will ever again see a pitcher who even approaches 175 complete games over the course of his career because the game has changed so much. These days, pitchers are on strict pitch counts and rarely go past the seventh inning, at most.

Since 1973, Morris, who debuted in 1977, pitched at least eight innings more times than any other pitcher in baseball, a testament to his durability and consistency.

Morris also started the most games, pitched the most innings and had the most wins of any pitcher in the 1980s.

On the other hand, during the '80s, Morris also led all of Major League Baseball in losses, runs allowed, earned runs allowed, hits allowed and home runs allowed. While those numbers could be a byproduct of pitching so many innings, they are glaring nonetheless.

Additionally, Morris led the league in wild pitches on six separate occasions, and his 206 career wild pitches rank eighth in baseball history.

Morris has the highest ERA of any pitcher in the Hall of Fame. He also failed to win 300 games or strikeout 3,000 batters, general Hall of Fame litmus tests.

Morris built his reputation in the post-season and played on four World Championship teams (1984 Tigers, 1991 Twins, and 1992–1993 Blue Jays).

While the post-season is only part of a pitcher’s career and resume, the Modern Baseball Era Committee seemed to have placed extra emphasis on this. There are only five pitchers in the Baseball Hall of Fame who never played or pitched in the World Series.

So here’s the question: Is Jack Morris a bona fide Hall of Famer or just a borderline candidate who was very good, but not great?

For Morris' supporters, and Morris himself, the strength of his argument has always been his postseason performance.

However, Morris was 7-4 with a 3.80 ERA in the postseason. If that’s the best argument for why he should be in the HOF, it’s not a very reasoned or rational one.

Morris had to rely on a special committee because the Baseball Writers’ Association of America could see that his induction would lower the bar on the game's most hallowed institution, and now it has.

Take Heart Red Sox Fans; the Yankees Will Come to Regret Stanton Contract

The Yankees have been down this road before and it didn't end well.

The New York Yankees have a deal in place to acquire Giancarlo Stanton from the Marlins. This is surely a nightmare for almost all Red Sox fans.

The combination of Stanton, who led the majors with 59 home runs last season, and Aaron Judge, who was second with 52 homers, creates the modern day equivalent of Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig or Mickey Mantle and Roger Maris, at the least.

The Yankees' offense will be a juggernaut. Even without Stanton, the 2017 Yankees were first in the majors in homers (241) and second in runs (858).

The deal is contingent on Stanton’s willingness to waive his no-trade clause, which he reportedly will for the Yankees, Dodgers, Astros and Cubs.

Take solace Red Sox fans; there is plenty of reason for concern about Stanton's massive contract, which has 10 years and $295 million remaining.

Yes, Stanton is elite offensive player... when healthy. The problem is that he is too often unhealthy/injured.

Over his first seven seasons (2010-16), Stanton averaged just 117 games. Last season he finally stayed healthy and played a career-high 159 games. In fact, through eight seasons, Stanton has played in at least 150 games just twice.

This is why I wasn't enthusiastic about the prospect of the Red Sox dealing for him.

Stanton is entering his age 28 season, meaning he is still in his prime and that his contract will run through his age 38 season, assuming he doesn't opt out after the 2020 season.

Players are typically at their best and healthiest in their 20s. Most players don't get better and healthier in their 30s, and that is what the Yankees are banking on.

There are eerie similarities between Stanton now and Alex Rodriguez in 2003, when New York obtained him in an offseason trade. A-Rod was also entering his age-28 season, was also the reigning MVP, was also playing for a losing team, also had an opt-out clause three years away and also had the biggest contract in the sport's history.

Yes, the Yankees won the World Series with A-Rod in 2009, but his last eight years in the Bronx were a huge letdown, at the least, and his contract proved to be a disaster for the Yankees, which they surely regret.

In 2007, Rodriguez opted out of his 10-year, $250 million contract, only to re-sign a new 10-year, $275 million deal with New York. That contract proved to be an albatross for the Yankees. They paid him to simply go away in 2017, the pact's final year.

Even excluding his 2014 suspension, A-Rod was injured and in serious decline for most of that 10-year contract. From 2008-16, excluding his 2014 suspension, A-Rod averaged just 110 games per year.

In other words, out of a possible 1,458 games over that nine-year span, A-Rod played in just 880 games, and that was on top of the fact that he didn't play a single game in the 2014 and 2017 seasons.

It was a nightmare for the Yankees and it should surprise no one if that same fate repeats itself for New York, this time with Stanton.

If Stanton is injured again or decides not to opt-out for any reason, the Yankees are on the hook for the duration of the pact -- through the 2027 season -- since Stanton has full no-trade rights built into his deal.

As history shows, massive, long term contracts are only good for the players who sign them. The teams who agree to these deals are usually left holding the bag and with many regrets.

Alex Rodriguez, Prince Fielder, Carl Crawford, Jose Reyes, Josh Hamilton, Matt Kemp, Ryan Howard, Albert Pujols, for example, all vastly underperformed their expensive, long term contracts and the teams that signed them would surely love a do-over.

Boston has had its share of bad, long term pacts in recent years, including those of Hanley Ramirez, Pablo Sandoval and Rusney Castillo.

Just remember that, Red Sox fans, as you weep into your Wheaties this morning at the thought of Giancarlo Stanton in pinstripes.